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Resumen:  Existe una interesante polémica en el sec tor público, derivada de las tensiones
existentes en tre desempeño y flexibilidad administrativa por un lado, y rendición de cuentas y
con trol, por el otro. El propósito de este artículo es discutir la utilidad del modelo agente
principal para un mejor entendimiento de las tensiones en tre desempeño y rendición de
cuentas, así como analizar las similitudes y contradicciones de esta perspectiva teórica en
comparación con el movimiento de “reinvención del gobierno” de la década de los noventa en
Estados Unidos.
Palabras clave:  reinvención, gobierno, agente, prin ci pal, desempeño.
Ab stract:  It seems there is an in ter est ing bat tle in the pub lic sec tor, pit ting per for mance and
flex i bil ity against ac count abil ity and con trol.  The pur pose of this pa per is to dis cuss the
usefulness of the prin ci pal agent model in un der stand ing ad min is tra tive per for mance and
accountability prob lems and ten sions, and to an a lyze the sim i lar i ties and con tra dic tions of this 
the o ret i cal per spec tive as it re lates to the Amer i can “re in vent ing gov ern ment” move m ent of
the 1990s.
Key words:  Reinvention, prin ci pal, agency, per for mance, ac count abil ity.
In tro duc tion
It seems there is an in ter est ing bat tle in the pub lic sec tor, pit tingperformance and flex i bil ity against ac count abil ity and con trol.Many peo ple think that gov ern ment should be a per for mance-based
or ga ni za tion; these com men ta tors’ prin ci pal val ues would be
efficiency and ef fec tive ness. To ac com plish this, pub lic or ga ni za tions
need flex i bil ity, lead er ship, and in no va tion, among other ca pa bil i ties.
An other group em pha sizes that gov ern ment has to be con trolled by
cit i zens, and that pub lic of fi cials should be ac count able for their
actions and the con se quences of those ac tions; these com men ta tors
think that the main char ac ter is tics of gov ern ment should be
accountability, le git i macy, and le gal ity. There is an ob vi ous ten sion
be tween these two dif fer ent po si tions. It would be dif fi cult to have all
the dif fer ent val ues and char ac ter is tics in one po lit i cal sys tem at the
same time.
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The prin ci pal-agent model is a the o ret i cal tool that tries to deal with
both prob lems. How ever it has some spe cific downsides when its
prescriptions are im ple mented in pub lic sec tor. The pur pose of this
paper is to dis cuss the use ful ness of this model in un der stand ing
administrative per for mance and ac count abil ity prob lems, and to
analyze the sim i lar i ties and con tra dic tions of this per spec tive as it
relates to the “re in vent ing gov ern ment” move ment of the 1990s.
The pa per is di vided into five sec tions. Sec tion one pres ents the
main ten ets of the prin ci pal-agent model as they ap ply to pub lic
administration. In the sec ond sec tion, the ten sions be tween
administrative per for mance and ac count abil ity are pre sented and
discussed.  A crit i cal eval u a tion of the strengths and weak nesses of the
prin ci pal agent per spec tive is pre sented in the third sec tion.  Sec tion
four de scribes and com pares some im pli ca tions of the prin ci pal-agent
per spec tive for the ideas lead ing the “re in vent ing gov ern ment”
movement of the 1990s. Finally, we pres ent some re flec tions and
conclusions re gard ing the per sua sive ness and fea si bil ity of the
principal agent and reinvention ap proaches in deal ing with
performance and ac count abil ity prob lems in the pub lic sec tor.
Prin ci pal-agent model in gov ern ment
From a prin ci pal-agent point of view, we are fac ing a clear agency
prob lem in gov ern ment. On one hand, we have the pres i dent try ing to
keep the agen cies ac count able and de velop or main tain good lev els of
agency per for mance. On the other hand, we have agen cies that do not
have the nec es sary in cen tives to act in that way.  Agencies have
considerably more in for ma tion in their ar eas of ex per tise than does the
pres i dent, and the pres i dent there fore can not re ally know if the
agencies are do ing well.
As we know the prin ci pal-agent model is an an a lytic ex pres sion of
the agency re la tion ship, in which one party, the prin ci pal, con sid ers
entering into a con trac tual agree ment with an other party, the agent,
with the ex pec ta tion that the agent will sub se quently choose ac tions
that pro duce out comes de sired by the prin ci pal (Moe 1984, 756). This
kind of anal y sis is part of a broader the o ret i cal frame work called New
Eco nom ics of Or ga ni za tion.
In the case of the pub lic bu reau cracy, and this could be ap plied to the 
pub lic ad min is tra tion of the United States, the eco nom ics of
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organization can help us to an swer three ques tions: 1) Why do pub lic
bu reaus ex ists, as op posed to al ter na tive ar range ments for the
provision of pub lic ser vices? 2) How can bu reau cratic su pe ri ors
control bu reau cratic sub or di nates? 3) How can pol i ti cians, as
principals, con trol their bu reau cratic agents? (Moe, 1984).
We can see our dem o cratic ac count abil ity as a whole chain of
principal-agent re la tion ships, from cit i zens to pol i ti cians to
bureaucratic su pe ri ors to bu reau cratic sub or di nates and on down the
hi er ar chy of gov ern ment to the low est level bu reau crats who ac tu ally
de liver ser vices di rectly to cit i zens (Moe, 1984: 765).
The more gen eral prin ci pal-agent mod els of hi er ar chi cal con trol
have shown that, un der a range of con di tions, the prin ci pal’s op ti mal
in cen tive struc ture for the agent is one in which the lat ter re ceives some 
share of the re sid ual in pay ment for his ef forts, thus giv ing him a di rect
stake in the out come (Moe, 1984).  There is not re sid ual in gov ern ment
in the or di nary sense. Maybe the better con cept to take the place of
residual is slack, the dif fer ence be tween the true min i mum cost of the
ser vice pro vi sion and what the bu reau ac tu ally spends (the bud get).
How ever, there are many con di tions in gov ern ment that are
obstacles to a good ap pli ca tion of the prin ci pal-agent model.  If we
want to have a gov ern ment that per forms well but at the same time have 
con trol of its ac tions, we need to think about these con di tions. The first
cru cial dif fer ence is that slack is only avail able to the ex tent that the
bureau as a whole op er ates in ef fi ciently by pro duc ing at greater than
min i mum cost, with bud get ex ceed ing the true costs of pro duc tion.
The sec ond con sid er ation is that it is only rea son able to sug gest that
pe cu ni ary gain is far more sa lient a mo ti va tor for top-level man ag ers in
the pri vate sec tor than for top-level bu reau crats in the pub lic sec tor.
Political the o ries have rec og nized that the sa lience of spe cific
motivators var ies across bu reau cratic of fi cials and with the na ture of
the ap point ment.  In ad di tion, pub lic man ag ers must op er ate within an
or ga ni za tional con text the struc ture and ob jec tives of which are in
important re spects im posed by out side ac tors (Moe, 1984: 764).
All these rules place sev eral con straints on the abil ity of pub lic
mana gers to do what the con trac tual par a digm im plies they ought to be
do ing in the in ter est of hi er ar chi cal con trol: screen ing and se lect ing
appropriate per son nel, weed ing out the in ap pro pri ate, and de sign ing
in cen tive struc tures that con duce to max i mal com pli ance. On the other
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hand, for ex am ple, the Free dom of In for ma tion Act re quires that many
agency files be open to the pub lic upon de mand, im plic itly
encouraging bu reau crats to con strain their in ter nal com mu ni ca tions
and stor age of in for ma tion (Moe, 1984).
Ad min is tra tive per for mance and ac count abil ity
As was es tab lished early in this pa per, per for mance is not the only
thing that cit i zens ex pect from gov ern ment. They also ex pect to have
some sense of dem o cratic con trol. For some schol ars, ac count abil ity is
one of the most im por tant fea tures of any dem o cratic gov ern ment
(Behn, 2001). This is not a new ar gu ment, “mill rec og nizes that
perhaps the grav est prob lems of bu reau cracy within rep re sen ta tive
gov ern ment are con trol, ac count abil ity and re spon si bil ity”(Warner,
2001: 409).
Ac count abil ity could be seen in many dif fer ent ways, but im plicit
within it is the idea of dem o cratic con trol. If we re view the his tory of
dif fer ent gov ern ments we can un der stand why peo ple con sid ered
accountability as at least one of the main val ues (Rosenbloom, 2001). 
Un for tu nately, pub lic ser vants are not al ways pub lic spir ited and do not 
al ways work for the pub lic in ter est or the gen eral wel fare (Moe, 1994).
In most of the cases, for ac count abil ity hold ers, ac count abil ity
means pun ish ment (Behn, 2001). Their prin ci pal job is to de tect
problems in the be hav ior of pub lic of fi cials or pub lic man ag ers and try
to be the first per son who dis cov ers that some one did some thing
wrong. Ac count abil ity is a part of the dem o cratic idea. “Pub lic
Administration schools have al ways rec og nized that in Amer i can
governance and lib eral dem o cratic thought, ac count abil ity re mains
institutionally based and me di ated through law, over sight, and
election” (Dobel, 2001: 167).
It would be dif fi cult to say that there is only one kind of
accountability.  Ac count abil ity is a con cept with dif fer ent
interpretations and di men sions. Behn (2001) says that we have at least
three types of ac count abil ity: ac count abil ity for fi nance, for fair ness,
and for per for mance. The first one is maybe the most ob vi ous and easy
to iden tify. It fo cuses on fi nan cial ac count ing, in other words, “on how
the books are kept and how the money is spent” (Behn, 2001: 7).
Ac count abil ity for fair ness is more re lated to our per cep tion of
equity in our re la tions with gov ern ment. We want gov ern ment to be
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exceptionally fair to its em ploy ees, con trac tors, cli ents, and cit i zens.
Some rules em body and de fine what we, as a so ci ety, mean by eq uity
and fair ness. Behn (2001) says that these two first kinds of
accountability have a very sim i lar pro cess for be ing cre ated: 1) de cide
what val ues we want gov ern ment to up hold; 2) cre ate rules, pro ce dures 
and stan dards to es tab lish what the or ga ni za tion should and should not
do; 3) re quire the or ga ni za tion and its man ag ers to keep a lot of re cords
of what it did; and 4) au dit these re cords to en sure that the or ga ni za tion
and its man ag ers did fol low the rules, stan dards and pro ce dures. And, if 
we dis cover that they did not do so, we hold them ac count able by
punishing them.
This pro cess, how ever, is not as clear in the case of ac count abil ity
for per for mance.  “Gov ern ment is not only sup posed to use money
prudently and to treat ev ery one fairly; it is also sup posed to ac com plish
pub lic pur poses” (Behn, 2001: 9). Ac count abil ity for per for mance
needs cer tain tar gets and goals, but the ways of es tab lish ing the
relationship with cit i zens are not rules, pro ce dures and stan dards.
Actually, this set of in sti tu tions can be an ob sta cle for per form ing well.
In deed, in the words of Behn (2001), the ac count abil ity rules for
finance and fair ness can hin der or ac tively thwart per for mance. The
accountability di lemma for Behn (2001) is the trade-off be tween
accountability for fi nance and fair ness and ac count abil ity for
performance.
There fore, ac count abil ity and per for mance are not nec es sary
compatible. In the o ret i cal terms, and many times in prac ti cal terms as
well, these two kinds of ac count abil ity are look ing for dif fer ent goals,
us ing dif fer ent tools, and need dif fer ent val ues to be ac com plished. 
Con structs such as re in vent ing gov ern ment (Osborne and Gabler,
1992) or the post-bureaucratic model (Barzelay and Armajani, 1992)
ar gue that gov ern ment should go in both di rec tions. Be sides, now a days 
it is more com mon to hear about big na tional gov ern men tal re forms
(Light, 1997) and not about spe cific and fo cused changes. So we are
fac ing big re forms with con tra dic tory val ues and ob jec tives.
All re forms need not only to dem on strate that they can do the things
better in gov ern ment, but they also need to show how the new ca pac ity
can af fect the pub lic pur poses and dem o cratic ac count abil ity es tab lish
in our le gal and con sti tu tional frame work (Behn, 2001; Lynn, 2001).
This is not only a nor ma tive pre scrip tion; this is also what we have
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learned from prac ti cal ex pe ri ences of gov ern ment re form that did not
take into ac count the role of Con gress and cit i zens (Kettl and DiIulio,
1995; Light, 1997). As Rosenbloom (2001) says, re form ers need to see
the his tory and find how most of the red tape and micromanagement
that they want to dis ap pear were put in place in the 1940s and later,
largely to pro tect val ues such as equal op por tu nity, jus tice, di ver sity
and de moc racy.
Prin ci pal-agent ap proach for study ing per for mance and
ac count abil ity
The prin ci pal-agent model is not al ways a good ap proach to
understand the pub lic sec tor. DiIulio (1994) es tab lishes that we have
agen cies that are re ally do ing what their of fi cials ex pect from them. We 
have cases of prin ci pled agents and, ac cord ing to DiIulio, they are the
rule and not the ex cep tion in the Amer i can pub lic ad min is tra tion.
The prin ci pal-agent model es tab lishes that most bu reau crats are not
pub lic-spirited souls but rather are self-seeking slugs who are dis posed
to shirk, sub vert, and steal when ever and wher ever they can get away
with it (DiIulio, 1994: 278). In ad di tion, ac cord ing to prin ci ple-agent
model, gov ern ment bu reau crats, even those who are well mean ing and
pub lic spir ited, are in ev i ta bly drawn to work less hard than they are
capable of work ing, to do no real work at all, or even to drag down the
pro duc tiv ity of those around them (DiIulio, 1994).
Ra tio nal choice the o ries and prin ci pal-agent mod els help to ex plain
why bu reau crats shirk, sub vert, and steal on the job, but they have lit tle
to say in the pres ence of bu reau crats who strive (work hard and go “by
the book”), sup port (put pub lic and or ga ni za tional goals ahead of
private goals), and sac ri fice (go “above and be yond the call of duty”)
on the job (DiIulio, 1994: 281). Now, we know that at least some
government bu reau cra cies have tran scended prin ci pal-agent prob lems
mainly by cre at ing and sus tain ing cul tures of prin ci pled agents
(DiIulio, 1994).
These strong-culture or ga ni za tions do not just hap pen in a vac uum.
There is an im por tant role for the or ga ni za tional lead ers who ei ther set
or do not set in mo tion the or ga ni za tional so cial iza tion pro cesses that
tran scend prin ci pal-agent prob lems by nur tur ing a cul ture of prin ci pled 
agents (DiIulio, 1994). Many peo ple have dis cussed lead er ship in the
pub lic sec tor and its role in build ing a strong cul ture of ser vice and
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public spirit. What is rel a tively new, how ever, is the rec og ni tion that
the im por tance of lead er ship in gov ern ment has less to do with
cultivating out side con stit u ency groups, fine-tuning pay-scales, or
refereeing intra or inter-bureaucratic bat tles, and more to do with
establishing so cial and moral re ward sys tems that make it pos si ble for
gov ern ment agen cies to tap the cre ativ ity, sense of duty, and
public-spiritedness of their work ers (DiIulio, 1994).
Even in the bow els of the gov ern ment agen cies, there is more
self-sacrifice, and less self-interest, than ra tio nal choice the ory al lows
for and can ex plain. If we re ally want a gov ern ment that can per form
well, we need to se lect more good lead ers as heads of the agen cies with
the ca pac ity of gen er at ing a strong cul ture of prin ci pled agents. As we
can see there are some phe nom ena that are dif fi cult to be ex plained by
the prin ci pal-agent per spec tive. There fore, it is nec es sary to iden tify
some strengths and weak nesses of the prin ci pal-agent model in
understanding is sues re lated to per for mance and ac count abil ity in
governmental agen cies.
Strengths and weak nesses
The prob lems of po lit i cal con trol could be anal o gous, in many
respects, to the eco nomic prob lem of the sep a ra tion of own er ship and
con trol, with pol i ti cians at tempt ing to con trol bu reau crats rather than
stock hold ers try ing to con trol man ag ers (Moe, 1984). There fore, the
prin ci pal-agent model can help to un der stand the main re la tion ships
be tween pub lic of fi cials and pub lic ser vants that can be iden ti fied as
per for mance re lated. On the other hand, this agency per spec tive could
be use ful to an a lyze some of the re la tion ships be tween pol i ti cians and
cit i zens that are more re lated to ac count abil ity.
How ever, there are some im por tant dif fer ences in the pub lic sec tor
that can be seen as weak nesses in the prin ci pal-agent model: 1) the
empirical di ver sity and am bi gu ity of in di vid ual goals, since there are
no sim ple quan ti ties like in come or profit; 2) pol i ti cians can not count
on the eco nomic re sid ual, as can the stock hold ers of a cor po ra tion
would in mo ti vat ing their man ag ers; 3) pol i ti cians do not have some
ex ter nal mech a nisms to sub sti tute their di rect knowl edge like stock
mar ket eval u a tion of com pany’s prof it abil ity, la bor mar ket eval u a tion
of a man ager’s eco nomic value, the threat of take overs; 4) pol i ti cians
op er ate un der heavy con straints in their ef fort to ex er cise con trol over
bu reau crats; 5) any given bu reau is likely to have mul ti ple prin ci pals;
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and 6) po lit i cal con trol is also un der mined by mul ti ple-agent
arrangements (Moe, 1984). Deal ing with these dif fer ences in the
implementation of a sys tem of in cen tives for bu reau crats is the big
chal lenge of those who are in fa vor of the ap pli ca tion of the
principal-agent per spec tive in the pub lic sec tor.
The reinvention move ment in the United States
The Na tional Per for mance Re view (NPR) may be the best-known
pro gram of the Amer i can reinvention move ment.  How ever, we are not
talk ing about a sin gle pro ject, but a se ries of dif fer ent ef forts that took
place over an ap prox i mately 7 year pe riod, start ing with the found ing
of the NPR in 1993 and end ing with the 2000 Pres i den tial elec tion. 
Some of the im por tant doc u ments from this pe riod are: From Red Tape
To Re sults: Cre ating a Gov ern ment that Works Better and Costs Less
(1993), Cre ating a Gov ern ment that Works Better and Costs Less:
Status Re port (1994), Com mon Sense Gov ern ment: Works Better and
Costs Less (1995), and The Best Kept Se crets in Gov ern ment (1996). 
These doc u ments were very im por tant in de fin ing the dif fer ent
components, or phases, of the reinvention.
Phase I: Some schol ars think there were at least two dif fer ent
phases in the ref or ma tion ef fort. Kettl (2000) iden ti fies three phases,
re fer ring to them as “three dif fer ent reinventions”. Dur ing phase one,
hun dreds of reinventors were sent to the dif fer ent agen cies to iden tify
op por tu ni ties for de creas ing waste and im prov ing man age ment. In
March of 1993 the Na tional Per for mance Re view (NPR) was launched
and 384 rec om men da tions were pre sented. The prom ise was to save
$108 bil lion and to re duce the Fed eral workforce by 12 per cent within
five years (Kettl, 2000).
The Na tional Per for mance Re view’s four broad pol icy goals were
de rived from Osborne and Gabler’s Re in venting Gov ern ment (Light,
1997): 1) “Cut ting Red Tape”, in clud ing stream lin ing the bud get
process, de cen tral iz ing per son nel pol icy, re ori ent ing the in spec tors
gen eral, and em pow er ing state and lo cal gov ern ments; 2) “Putting
Cus tomers First”, in clud ing mak ing ser vice or ga ni za tions com pete
and us ing mar ket mech a nisms to solve prob lems; 3) “Em powering
Em ployees to Get Re sults”, in clud ing de cen tral iz ing de ci sion-making
power, form ing a la bor-management part ner ship, and ex ert ing
leadership; and 4) “Cut ting Back to Ba sics”, in clud ing elim i nat ing
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programs, in vest ing in greater pro duc tiv ity, and reengineering
programs to cut costs.
The most im por tant ini tia tives of this phase were the down siz ing of
gov ern ment, and the en act ment of re forms in gov ern ment pro cure ment 
and cus tomer ser vice (Kettl, 2000). The most ef fec tive way to re duce
the size of gov ern ment is to re duce the workforce; the Na tional
Performance Re view pro posed to elim i nate 252 000 fed eral jobs. The
Fed eral Ac qui si tion Stream lining Act sim pli fied pro cure ment
regulations and gave man ag ers more flex i bil ity in buy ing goods.
Procurement re form in the United States went deeper than sim i lar
reforms en acted in such coun tries as the United King dom, Aus tra lia,
and New Zea land (Barzelay, 2001).  Finally, de spite the po lemic about
see ing cit i zens as cus tom ers, the cus tomer-centered strat egy al lowed
many gov ern ment agen cies to re think their ser vices. The cus tomer
service ini tia tive en cour aged many pub lic ser vants to fo cus on broader
pol icy goals in stead of each agency’s in ter est (Kettl, 2000).
Phase II: Phase one pre sented a prac ti cal di lemma. It needed the
sup port of pub lic ser vants to de velop em pow er ing pub lic agen cies, but
at the same time it needed to cut costs by re mov ing many pub lic
servants from their jobs. In spite of this ten sion,“[b]y the end of 1994
the cus tomer ser vice ini tia tives were un der way, Con gress had passed
pro cure ment re form, and the ad min is tra tion had sig nif i cantly
downsized the fed eral work force” (Kettl, 2000: 17). The ba sic idea
behind phase two was to re view what gov ern ment should do.
The Re pub li can Con gress that won the elec tions of 1994 pushed the
Clinton ad min is tra tion to ques tion the ex is tence of cer tain pro grams
and agen cies. The point was not only to im prove what gov ern ment was
do ing, but also to de cide whether the gov ern ment should per form
certain func tions at all. “No pro gram was to be taken for granted.
[Gore] even asked man ag ers to con sider the im pli ca tions if their
agency were elim i nated” (Kettl, 2000: 17). How ever, the num ber of
agen cies re mained more or less the same and the mas sive erad i ca tion of 
pro grams never took place.
Un doubt edly, the key stones of this phase were down siz ing and cost
sav ings.  How ever, as sess ing cost sav ings is very dif fi cult, and the
National Per for mance Re view re ported a sav ings of $12.3 bil lion in the 
first four years. “De spite the grand rhe tor i cal skir mishes, the bat tle
[between Clinton’s ad min is tra tion and the Re pub li can Con gress]
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ended it a draw with lit tle sort ing out of gov ern ment func tions,
reorganizing of its op er a tions, or min i miz ing of its role” (Kettl, 2000:
18).
Phase III. One last shift in the fo cus and em pha sis of the
reinvention move ment oc curred in 1998.  Taking into ac count the
loom ing pres i den tial elec tion of 2000, Gore launched a new phase of
the reinvention. The Na tional Per for mance Re view was re-christened
the Na tional Part ner ship for Re in venting Gov ern ment. The goals of
this new phase were much broader and more dif fi cult to mea sure than
those of the other two phases, in clud ing such gen er al ized ob jec tives as
a “safe and healthy Amer ica”, a “strong econ omy”, or the
“best-managed gov ern ment ever”.
The in ten tion to use in for ma tion tech nol ogy as a means to im prove
gov ern ment was ev i dent in the new slo gan, “Amer ica @ its Best”. The
idea was to de velop an in for ma tion-age gov ern ment that was man aged
like one of the best Amer i can com pa nies. The ad min is tra tion also
attempted to nar row the scope of the reinvention pro grams. “The
administration fo cused most of its reinvention ef forts on thirty two
‘high-impact agen cies’ that dealt most di rectly with cit i zens, where the
fail ure to re form quickly could fur ther un der mine the ef fort (as in the
case of the In ter nal Rev e nue Ser vice [IRS])” (Kettl, 2000: 18).
There was a ten sion be tween the broader po lit i cal goals of this new
reinvention and the more lo cal ized im prove ments that man ag ers were
try ing to im ple ment. “In seek ing po lit i cal rel e vance, the reinventor
nec es sar ily dis tanced Phase III of the NPR from its abil ity to achieve
and pro duce mea sur able re sults” (Kettl, 2000: 20). The ef forts of the
dif fer ent agen cies in im prov ing their op er a tions did not have a di rect
re la tion with the po lit i cal goals that Gore and his team were prom is ing
from this “new” reinvention move ment.
Some Reinvention Re sults
It is dif fi cult to eval u ate the re sults of such a big and com plex
program. First, as was es tab lished ear lier, there was not a sin gle
reinvention pro gram, but a col lec tion of very dif fer ent pro jects and
actions. Sec ond, some of the re sults can not be di rectly at trib uted to the
reinvention move ment. Some agen cies con sid ered bench mark cases
for the reinvention were ac tu ally work ing on im prove ments even
before the reinvention move ment started (Radin, 1995). There fore, this 
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sec tion only pres ents some gen eral re sults linked with the NPR in its
three phases.
In gen eral terms, the pro cure ment re form and the cus tomer ser vice
ini tia tive seem to be the only clear re sults of the reinvention move ment. 
“NPR of fi cials claimed that more than 4 000 cus tomer ser vice
standards had been im ple mented in more than 570 gov ern ment
agencies and pro grams” (Kettl, 2000: 20). How ever, the rel a tive
priority of the sev eral reinvention pro grams was very dif fer ent from
agency to agency. In a sur vey con ducted in 1996, only 37% of fed eral
em ploy ees thought that reinvention was top pri or ity in their
organization. It ap pears that the reinvention team for got to take into
account many of the po lit i cal ap point ees who were sup posed to be in
charge of the reinvention ef fort. The lack of lead er ship in many
agencies led to poor re sults.
Fur ther, it is not clear that the NPR in fact helped to cut costs and
save money. The re duc tion of the num ber of pub lic em ploy ees is an
example. Over 300 000 po si tions were elim i nated from 1993 to 1998.
“The NPR did in deed re duce the num ber of fed eral gov ern ment
employees to a level lower than any time since the Ken nedy
administration” (Kettl, 2000: 21). How ever, this re duc tion was not
equally im por tant for all agen cies. While the Gen eral Ser vices
Administration was re duced in 30.8% and the Of fice of Per son nel
Man age ment was down sized by 47.4%, the De part ment of Jus tice
grew 21%.
As we can see, it is not clear whether the NPR just strength ened
pre-existing ten den cies or ac tu ally changed the way gov ern ment
worked. What seems to be clear is that the reinvention move ment was
more suc cess ful in some ar eas and agen cies than in oth ers.  This pa per
does not fo cus on any of the dif fer ent stages or phases of the Na tional
Per for mance Re view.  The ob jec tive of this pa per is to per form a
general eval u a tion of the NPR’s goals and ac tual re sults in terms of
performance and ac count abil ity. No spe cific case is go ing to be
analyzed in de tail. The main idea is to con sider the reinvention
movement in a con cep tual or the o ret i cal way, in or der to com pare it
with agency the ory.
The ba sic idea be hind the ref or ma tion ini tia tive was that
“government of fi cials must man age for re sults, not just rules and
regulations. This ac count abil ity both em pow ers and re wards those
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who im prove per for mance” (Light, 1997: 39). There fore, the
following sec tions fo cus on the use ful ness of the prin ci pal-agent model 
to un der stand ing the ten sions be tween per for mance and
accountability, and to com pare this the o ret i cal model with the ba sic
assumptions of the reinvention move ment in the United States.
The prin ci pal-agent model and the reinvention ma chine
As was ex plained ear lier, per for mance and ac count abil ity are some
of the gov ern ment char ac ter is tics that many peo ple de sire for their own 
coun try. These two fac tors ap pear not to be com ple men tary but
contrary. Some times we be lieve that there is a trade off be tween them
and when a po lit i cal and ad min is tra tive sys tem wins some
accountability it has to de crease its level of per for mance.
The New Pub lic Man age ment (NPM) has em pha sized both of them
as de sir able com po nents of any gov ern men tal re form. Many coun tries
have at tempted to get the ben e fits from both of them (Kettl and DiIulio,
1995; Light, 1997), and many of these na tional re forms have been, at
least in some sense, a fail ure. There are also some ten sions at the
theoretical level.  Lynn (2001), for ex am ple, says that in many senses
NPM and the idea of re in vent ing gov ern ment could be more sim i lar to
what we call tra di tional pub lic ad min is tra tion (pol i tics and
administration di chot omy, prin ci ples of ad min is tra tion, lack of
accountability, etc.).
On the other hand, in their book en ti tled “In side the Reinvention
Ma chine” Don ald Kettl and John DiIulio pro vide what they call “the
first in de pend ent as sess ment of the Clinton ad min is tra tions
‘reinventing gov ern ment’ plan af ter more than a year of ef fort”. The
book pres ents dif fer ent anal y ses and opin ions from schol ars that in
some ways eval u ate the ac tual re sults of the Na tional Per for mance
Review.
John DiIulio pres ents the dif fer ent no tions of re in vent ing and
reforming gov ern ment.  He says “as the first year of the NPR drew to a
close, there were ba si cally two schools of thought about it, one on
balance pos i tive, the other on bal ance neg a tive”. The per cep tion of
DiIulio is that the neg a tive school had found more ad her ents than the
pos i tive one. They are try ing to have an ob jec tive eval u a tion of the first
year of the NPR. They try to show the neg a tive but also the pos i tive of
this gov ern ment re form.
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Kettl es tab lishes that the Na tional Per for mance Re view has at least
some pos i tive re sults. In the words of Kettl “in its first year, the NPR
has proven one of the most lively man age ment re forms in Amer i can
his tory. It has helped re ori ent the fed eral bu reau cracy to ward a far
more ef fec tive at tack on prob lems that it must learn to solve”. They did
not have the re sults they ex pected, be cause they wanted to do
everything at the same time. They have prac ti cal and the o ret i cal
contradictions in the whole dis course of re in vent ing.
Kettl iden ti fies some con tra dic tions that can be ex plained by the big
dif fer ences be tween the prin ci pal ad min is tra tive tools of the
movement: down siz ing, reengineering and con tin u ous im prove ment.
These man age ment in stru ments have very dif fer ent goals, di rec tions,
meth ods, cen tral fo cuses, and ac tions. These dif fer ences wanted to take 
the NPR to dif fer ent di rec tions at the same time. Kettl does not men tion 
per for mance as the goal of any of these main tools. It seems that Kettl,
like other au thors (for ex am ple, Light, 1997), con sid ers per for mance
and re sults were im por tant in the NPR, but it ap pears the he thinks they
were not the prin ci pal source of con tra dic tions.
Other im por tant in sight of Kettl is the de scrip tion of the miss ing
pieces. He says that “with out at tack ing and solv ing these miss ing
pieces of the pic ture, the NPR risks un der cut ting its prom ise”. The
miss ing pieces are: 1) a re form in the civil ser vice; 2) a big ger
investment for the long term; 3) ac tions for re in forc ing cen tral
administrative ca pac ity; 4) a re val u a tion im por tance of the Con gress;
5) a re eval u a tion of the me dia’s role; 6) a dif fer en ti a tion of the
high-risk pro grams; and 7) a sys tem atic ef fort to learn what the
reinvention move ment have to teach.
In the words of Kettl, suc cess ful reinvention needs: 1) cou pling the
driv ing ideas of the move ment to the fed eral gov ern ment mis sion; 2)
link ing the big pol i tics of down siz ing with the small pol i tics of
performance im prove ment; 3) de vel op ing a lan guage for talk ing about
it; 4) re in vent ing the job of fed eral man ag ers, es pe cially in
government’s mid dle, and 5) cre at ing the glue to bind the move ment
to gether.
Kettl and DiIulio tell us that, in gen eral, “the Na tional Per for mance
Re view ac com plished, in just its first year, far more than any one
thought pos si ble” (Kettl and DiIulio, 1995). But this move ment paid
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much more at ten tion to the re sults in the short term and “failed to build
the foun da tion for suc cess in the long run”.
De spite of the dif fer ences in scope, there are some im por tant
characteristics that many schol ars and prac ti tio ners have iden ti fied as
part of this re form ing move ment. Most of them agree that maybe the
most im por tant char ac ter is tic is the em pha sis in im prov ing the
performance of the pub lic sec tor (Behn, 2001; Light, 1997; Kettl and
DiIulio, 1995). Many of the prin ci pal ideas of “re in vent ing
government” are based in man a ge rial and eco nomic the o ries (see
Osborne and Gabler, 1992).
We do not have a clear map of bu reau cratic dis cre tion and
accountability. We have dif fer ent po si tions, and one of them holds that
we can change their be hav iors and make them to do what pol i ti cians
and cit i zens re ally want. Prin ci pal-agent model and in some sense the
reinvention move ment as sumes that with the cor rect in cen tives
(positive and neg a tive), we can change the be hav ior of the
bureaucracy, po lit i cal ap point ees and mem bers of Con gress.
It would be dif fi cult to say that we do not want a gov ern ment that
“per forms better and costs less” as the Na tional Per for mance Re view
ar gued. Per for mance is a very im por tant char ac ter is tic of a suc cess ful
mod ern gov ern ment. We do not want only a gov ern ment that
represents our in ter ests in a dem o cratic way, but we ask for a
government that can also give us the best pos si ble level and qual ity of
ser vices. Per for mance has be come one of the main mea sures of suc cess 
in pub lic sec tor.
For the reinvention move ment the per for mance-measurement
system is a clear link be tween per for mance and ac count abil ity. They
claim that if we es tab lish clear goals for the bu reau crats, we do not need 
to worry about the pro ce dures and the means that they use to achieve
the gen eral ob jec tives. A sim i lar link is de vel oped in the
principal-agent model, but the big dif fer ence is that the re in vent ing
gov ern ment move ment thinks about the pub lic ser vants as pub lic
spirited and well-prepared peo ple, while the prin ci pal agent model
assumes that we are deal ing with self ish and self-interested agents.
Fi nal re flec tions
As we can see, the re in vent ing gov ern ment move ment and the
principal-agent model are two dif fer ent in stru ments each at tempt ing to
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face the un solved prob lems be tween per for mance and ac count abil ity.
It is in ter est ing to see how both per spec tives try to place the prob lem in
the mea sure ment of out comes and the con struc tion of in cen tives for
agen cies and peo ple. But it is im por tant to clar ify that in pub lic pol icy
the prob lems and out comes are con structed by peo ple in com plex
processes of in ter ac tions and ne go ti a tion (Wildavsky, 1993).
So we have still the prob lem about who is go ing to de fine the
problems and who is go ing to es tab lish the goals, ob jec tives and
performance mea sures. We can think also that this whole ef fort is
worth less be cause the ul ti mate pur pose of gov er nance is not -or should
not be- ef fi ciency, but more im por tant val ues (Dobel, 2001).
Gov ern ment is dy namic be cause the na ture of so ci ety is dy namic
too. Now, Pub lic Ad min is tra tion is fac ing new chal lenges. It is not only 
the prob lem of how to keep our pub lic of fi cials and pub lic man ag ers
ac count able, but we have also the prob lem of hav ing new agency
relationships with dif fer ent non-profits and pri vate agen cies for
providing a great va ri ety of ser vices.  The con tract ing re la tion ship by
it self is a prin ci pal-agent chal lenge (Kettl, 1993; Lipsky and Smith,
1989), and the idea of per for mance and ac count abil ity in those kinds of
new part ner ships is a topic that needs to be very well dis cussed (Moe,
2001).
As we can see, in the ex treme, nei ther the re in vent ing gov ern ment
move ment nor the prin ci pal-agent model can ac com plish their goals
re gard ing both per for mance and ac count abil ity. On the side of
performance mea sure ments as bu reau crats’ in cen tives, we have that in
many cases those mea sures are and have to be the re sult of po lit i cal
negotiations be tween the dif fer ent agen cies and mem bers of Con gress.
The prom ise of an ob jec tive and tech ni cal def i ni tion of these
performance in cen tives is al most im pos si ble to achieve, at least in
settings like dem o cratic sys tems (Derthick, 1990).
On the other side, ac count abil ity could be come a big ger prob lem.
With the tra di tional sys tem the in puts and some out puts are rel a tively
clear. The reinvention move ment pro poses to pay more at ten tion in the
out comes and give more le gal dis cre tion to bu reau crats and pub lic
officials. It is more dif fi cult to have good mea sure ments of out comes.
Thus, we are go ing to be in the po si tion of not hav ing good
measurements of out comes and also not hav ing con trol of in puts and
out puts.
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In this sense, the Na tional Per for mance Re view can be seen as a
partial suc cess. It achieved much more than any one imag ined at the
time the pro gram started (Kettl and DiIulio, 1995). The re sults of the
NPR can be an a lyzed at least in two dif fer ent ways. First, it seems clear
that, while most of the agen cies could not ac com plish the goals
established in their NPR rec om men da tions, some or ga ni za tions were
able to over come var i ous forces and carry out both pol icy and
management change (Green, 2000; Radin, 1995).
On the other hand, it ap pears that dif fer ent func tions of gov ern ment
had dif fer ent lev els of im prove ment. Barzelay (2001) com pares the
results ob tained in the United King dom, New Zea land, and Aus tra lia,
which are con sid ered the bench mark cases, with the re sults of the NPR
in its dif fer ent phases. He ar gues that in the United States there was a
rel a tive lack of change in the ar eas of fi nan cial man age ment and
organization, a sim i lar level of change in the area of au dit and
evaluation, and an ap par ently more sub stan tial change in the area of
pro cure ment (Barzelay, 2001).
Finally, it seems clear that both ap proaches are use ful to un der stand
the mul ti ple re la tions in the pub lic sec tor.  The prin ci pal-agent model
can help us to an a lyze the dif fer ent in ter ac tions be tween sev eral
political ac tors and the role that the in cen tive sys tems play in a
democratic gov ern ment. The reinvention move ment showed us how a
con tra dic tory re form was im ple mented in one of the most com plex
political sys tems. We learned that many bu reau crats do not be have in
the way pre dicted by the prin ci pal-agent per spec tive. In my opin ion,
the les sons learned from both per spec tives are dif fer ent but equally
use ful  for  hav ing a  bet ter  un der  s tand ing of  the
performance-accountability prob lem in mod ern gov ern ments.
Fu ture re search should at tempt to ad dress a fun da men tal ques tion
re gard ing the util ity of these ap proaches to un der stand ing and deal ing
with the in creas ing com plex ity and un cer tainty that un der pins mod ern
gov er nance. One po ten tial means to ac com plish ing this the o ret i cal
objective might be to pay at ten tion to the dif fer ent at tempts to
interrelate per for mance and ac count abil ity in prac ti cal sys tems. That
is, we need to deeply study the ex pe ri ences of dif fer ent coun tries that
have tried to over come these ten sions in more prac ti cal ways, such as
en act ing a per for mance-oriented bud get or na tion-wide man a ge rial
reforms.
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It is nec es sary to be aware that agency the ory an a lyzes so cial
problems from an in di vid ual point of view. There fore, its po ten tial
power should be found in disaggregating com plex prob lems from
individual be hav iors. If we can un der stand how dif fer ent in di vid ual
behaviors in flu ence over all so cial prob lems, we are not solv ing the
prob lems, but we have a better un der stand ing of them, and thus have a
better chance to po ten tially deal with the in creas ing com plex ity of the
pub lic sec tor.
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